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Executive Summary
In May of 2008 an out-of-state corporation specializing 
in ethanol production announced that it was backing out 
of its plan to build a plant in upstate New York. This deci-
sion came as a surprise and as a disappointment because 
the company had invested a substantial amount of time 
and money into the project, and because the proposed 
ethanol plant held so much promise for the economically 
depressed region. 
This report focuses on why this seemingly ideal ethanol 
development project failed to materialize. Specifically, we 
asked: what is the relative importance of market factors 
and local permitting processes in siting a development 
project? What are the advantages and disadvantages of 
locally controlled permitting for development in upstate 
New York? Our study engaged with these questions and 
found that a mixture of local contingencies and market 
and political conditions combined to make it difficult 
to site the proposed ethanol plant. Specifically, the pro-
posed ethanol project failed for three key reasons. First, 
the local population distrusted town officials in charge of 
development as a result of past events. Added to that, the 
lack of transparency during the environmental review 
and land transfer process exacerbated existing distrust. 
Further, locals were concerned about how the project 
would impact a rare species that lived on the proposed 
development site. The constituents’ misgivings ultimately 
led to organized resistance in the form of a lawsuit as well 
as a widespread anti-ethanol development campaign. 
Second, New York State’s emphasis on local control am-
plified the impact of the existing distrust. Due to the way 
New York’s development process is structured, local of-
ficials, whom many residents already suspected of being 
corrupt, were in charge of evaluating and permitting the 
project. While local governance is not inherently anti-
thetical to successful development, in this case, because 
distrust of local officials was already a factor, the struc-
ture of New York’s permitting process amplified the effect 
of local resistance to the project. The state’s development 
process stipulates that public approval and local input 
are important and must be sought out at key moments 
during the permitting process. This stipulation afforded 
those who objected to the project numerous occasions to 
stall the permitting process. Lastly, the drop in ethanol 
profitability, which was caused by a combination of drop-
ping ethanol prices and rising production costs, rendered 
the project unviable. 
This case study demonstrates that economic develop-
ment is difficult to achieve because the favorable market 
conditions and political support are independently dy-
namic and must coincide for a project to move ahead. 
Moreover, economic development is typically not a step-
by-step process that inevitably leads to a capital outlay. 
To the contrary, the process is one that engages a number 
of economic and political actors pursuing diverse inter-
ests within a particular timeframe. In our case, by the 
time the political process associated with the permitting 
of the ethanol project was to be completed ethanol prices 
had dropped and the developers were unable to secure 
adequate returns on their investment.
Although few development processes are alike, there 
are certain factors that economic developers can take 
into account in a local economic development effort. 
Much attention is typically given to the costs of doing 
business and the general regulatory requirements. Less 
consideration, however, is given to the issues faced spe-
cifically when dealing with local authorities. Attention to 
such matters is particularly important in New York State, 
where the permitting process for any development is 
concentrated at the municipal level. 
More emphasis is needed on developing the capacity of 
local officials to facilitate development. Local leaders and 
officials must have the capacity to elaborate and imple-
ment development strategies and to fully take advantage 
of state and federal resources and opportunities. Leaders 
and public officials come from a variety of backgrounds 
and may not have had sufficient training to deal with 
complex and changing circumstances. They must have 
the capacity to competently manage the development 
process and instill the trust of their constituents. Only 
then can they effectively respond to emerging domestic 
and global market opportunities for community and eco-
nomic development. 
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Articulating Local Politics and Market Forces for Economic Development:
A Case Study of Ethanol Development in New York
Introduction
In May of 2008 an out-of-state corporation specializing 
in ethanol production announced that it was backing out 
of its plan to build a plant in Upstate New York. This deci-
sion came as a surprise and as a disappointment not only 
because the company had invested a substantial amount 
of time and money into the project, but also because the 
proposed ethanol plant held so much promise for the 
economically depressed region. 
The project began in early 2007 when the company 
linked up with a group of local New York farmers who 
were attempting to site a plant in their area. An unsuc-
cessful project had left these farmers in need of financial 
backing. The out-of-state corporation was, in turn, seek-
ing opportunities to expand its operation. Collaboration 
between the two parties promised to be mutually ben-
eficial; the arrangement gave local entrepreneurs access 
to technological and financial resources, while providing 
the out-of-state corporation with local knowledge and 
connections. 
The homegrown development project promised to cre-
ate jobs and establish a new market for local corn farm-
ers. Further, ethanol could be represented as a form of 
green development, which appealed to growing citizen 
environmental concerns throughout the state. Perhaps 
most importantly, the ethanol refinery was to be built 
on a redevelopment site in the center of the town. It had 
been difficult to find an alternate use for the site, due to 
limited infrastructure and the presence of a number of 
polluted “superfund” areas on the site. The developers 
had generously agreed to deal with all the limitations and 
stipulations that came with this unique piece of real es-
tate. Yet despite all its positive attributes, by early 2008, 
two years after the out-of-state corporation had first an-
nounced its decision to develop in New York, the project 
was still tied up in the permitting process. Six months 
later, in May 2008, the out-of-state corporation made a 
final announcement that it was backing out of the devel-
opment project altogether. 
In this report we attempt to understand why this seem-
ingly ideal ethanol development project failed to mate-
rialize. In particular, three questions guide our inquiry: 
What is the relative importance of political and market 
factors in determining the outcome of ethanol produc-
tion facility development in Upstate New York? What 
characteristics of different local permitting processes in 
New York are more or less amenable to articulation with 
markets? What are the advantages and disadvantages for 
articulation with markets of locally controlled permitting 
in New York? 
At the heart of our study is the desire to understand 
if New York State’s unique development process contrib-
uted to the state’s lagging economic development. While 
many believe that the market alone determines the fail-
ure or success of a development project, others refer to 
the characteristics of a particular place to justify why de-
velopment does or does not work. The latter argument is 
particularly pervasive in New York State. The assumption 
that characteristics intrinsic to New York—specifically, 
the structure of government, the high taxes, and the high 
level of government involvement and bureaucracy—are 
the principal causes of the state’s economic downturn is 
widespread. Indeed, during our research we were con-
tinually confronted with the argument that New York 
State’s governance structure caused the proposed ethanol 
development project to fail. As one developer we inter-
viewed explained, “The amount of red tape you have to 
go through in New York makes it tempting to move our 
capital to states like California or even countries like Bra-
zil or Argentina where they are grateful to get our busi-
ness and don’t put up so many obstacles in your way as 
they do here” (Interview, September 17, 2007). But is 
New York solely to blame when development projects go 
wrong?
In our case study, the proposed ethanol project would 
have been on the way if no local opposition had been 
raised during critical moments of the development pro-
cess. However, our case study also illustrates that no single 
actor or unique factor determines the success or failure 
of a development project. Local economic development 
is a complex process that involves a number of dynamic 
elements, many of which are unpredictable. Develop-
ment projects are completed when several conditions 
are met at critical moments. Of particular importance to 
economic development are market and political condi-
tions. Market conditions determine the extent to which 
investors are able to realize acceptable returns to their in-
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vestments. Political conditions represent public approval 
and general agreement that a proposed economic devel-
opment contributes to the public good. 
Economic development is difficult to achieve because 
the favorable market conditions and political support are 
independently dynamic and must coincide for a project 
to move ahead. Moreover, economic development is typ-
ically not a step-by-step process that inevitably leads to 
a capital outlay. To the contrary, the process is one that 
engages a number of economic and political actors pur-
suing particular interests and attempting to achieve some 
articulation of these interests within a particular time-
frame. In our case study, then, the ethanol development 
project failed both because local opposition and because 
New York State’s structure of governance delayed the de-
velopment project, but also because of the drop in the 
profitability of ethanol production. By the time the politi-
cal process associated with the development project was 
to be completed, the developers were unable to secure 
adequate returns on their investment. In other words, the 
project failed because the political and economic pro-
cesses did not articulate.
As such, our findings unsettle the unfounded, yet ubiq-
uitous, belief that the state’s unique development process 
caused the project to fail. To assume that factors intrinsic 
to New York, especially the state’s emphasis on local gov-
ernance, have singlehandedly caused the economic lag 
oversimplifies the complex interrelationships contribut-
ing to the state’s economic condition. Furthermore, it re-
inforces the notion that economic prosperity and local, 
democratic governance cannot co-exist. This stance, in 
turn, can lead those pursuing economic development to 
champion the abandonment of local democratic govern-
ment as a means to create a frictionless surface that is 
more appealing to global capital. Abandoning New York’s 
system of local governance for the sake of attracting de-
velopment is, however, to neglect the many positive at-
tributes of this form of governance. In would be to throw 
the baby out with the bathwater.
As will become evident in our report, local governance 
and development are not inherently incompatible. Rather, 
trust and clear communication are critical factors in de-
termining the success of a development project, regard-
less of whether governance occurs at the local, county or 
state level. New York State’s unique development process 
is not inherently antithetical to economic development. 
We suggest that instead of blaming the structure of New 
York’s development process, it would behoove those in-
terested in furthering economic development in the state 
to invest time and resources into establishing a compre-
hensive strategic plan that includes a programmatic ef-
fort to expand local expertise and capacity to shepherd 
desired economic developments that are compatible with 
the state’s unique development process.
In the end, while our analysis is certainly not exten-
sive, we hope that this report will offer insight into the 
challenges and opportunities of articulating political and 
market conditions for economic development in New 
York State more broadly. Because of the unpredictability 
and complexity of market and political processes, there 
is no simple recipe for economic development. However, 
there are certain factors that economic developers can 
take into account in a local economic development effort. 
Much attention is typically given to the costs of doing 
business and the general regulatory requirements. Less 
consideration, however, is given to the issues faced spe-
cifically when dealing with local authorities. Attention to 
such matters is particularly important in New York State, 
where the permitting process for any development is 
concentrated at the municipal level. It is our hope that 
insight into the development process through our case 
study can eventually increase the likelihood of successful 
economic development in New York.
Methods
Before we discuss our findings we would like to briefly 
outline our research methodology. From August 2007 
until August 2008, we conducted semi-structured in-
terviews with key informants involved with the ethanol 
project. We interviewed executives at the out-of-state 
company, officials at the local development agency, the 
local planning board and the planning board in the 
neighboring affected town. In addition, we interviewed 
individuals and groups who opposed the project as well 
as state-level development officers. Our list of informants 
is not exhaustive. We selected actors who we identified as 
key players—that is actors who were directly involved in 
the siting process. We purposely chose individuals who 
were, in our opinion, representative of their constituency. 
We conducted at least two interviews with each infor-
mant.
During the interviews, we asked respondents to re-
count the sequences of events from their first encounter 
with the proposal up to the abandonment of the proj-
ect. We also asked interviewees to speculate on what the 
problem was. That is, we asked them to explain why the 
development project was unsuccessful. We also inquired 
into actors’ perceptions of others involved in the process. 
Who else was involved? What steps were taken? What 
were the obstacles? In addition, we collected and ana-
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lyzed documents pertaining to the ethanol development 
project from institutional websites, blogs, published ma-
terials and news articles.
Overview of Findings
A mixture of local contingencies as well as structural 
market and political conditions articulated in such a way 
that made it difficult to site the proposed ethanol plant. 
Specifically, the proposed ethanol project failed for three 
key reasons. First, the local population distrusted town 
officials in charge of development as a result of past 
events. Miscommunication and lack of transparency 
during the permitting process for the ethanol plant fur-
ther intensified residents’ suspicion of local authorities. 
Residents claimed that the officials promoting the devel-
opment project were corrupt. Ultimately, the population’s 
misgivings, coupled with concern about the welfare of a 
rare species living on the proposed development site, led 
to organized resistance in the form of a lawsuit as well as 
a widespread anti-ethanol development campaign. 
New York State’s emphasis on local control amplified 
the impact of the existing distrust. Because of the way 
New York’s development process is structured, local of-
ficials, whom many residents already suspected of being 
corrupt, were in charge of evaluating and permitting the 
project. For instance, many distrusted the agency that 
coordinated the permitting process. Thus, the project 
was immediately perceived as yet another questionable 
endeavor led by a group of untrustworthy individuals. 
Had county or state officials, who were more removed 
from local politics and gossip, overseen the permitting 
process, the project might have been met with less initial 
resistance. Local control only amplified distrust. Had an-
other local agency with less of a negative reputation co-
ordinated and promoted the project, it would have, in all 
likelihood, been more readily accepted. New York’s em-
phasis on local control over development gave local re-
sisters the tools to stop the unwanted project. The state’s 
development process stipulates that public approval and 
local input are important and must be sought out at key 
moments during the permitting process. Local residents 
capitalized on this stipulation delaying the siting process 
until ethanol development was no longer economically 
viable.
Finally, market forces influenced the siting process. 
Renewable energy generally, and ethanol in particular, is 
a volatile form of capital investment. When the out-of-
town developers initially proposed to build a corn etha-
nol facility in New York, the profit margin for production 
was high. The businessmen expected to make a quick 
return based on the favorable market as well as the state 
and federal subsidies. A year later, by the time all neces-
sary permits were obtained and construction could final-
ly begin, ethanol production was not nearly as lucrative 
as it had been when the project had first been proposed. 
By the time the project could move ahead ethanol prices 
had dropped and production costs had risen. During an 
interview in September of 2007 the out-of-town devel-
oper explained:
The project has been stalled for too long. At this point 
there is no rush to get the plants running right away. 
Timing is everything. A plant should only be built when 
market conditions are favorable. At present the market is 
flooded. Had the plants been built when scheduled (not 
been slowed down by opposition) we would have been 
able to completely recover our initial investment within 
one or two years. The goal for our company at this point 
is to have the paperwork ready so should another window 
of opportunity arise, they are ready to build (Interview 
September 17, 2007).
Note that during this interview in September 2007 
the developer insisted that he would still wait for an-
other “window of opportunity”. By early 2008, however, 
the profit margin for ethanol had sunken even lower. It 
appeared unlikely that ethanol production would once 
again become as profitable as it had been in 2006. Six 
months later, the out-of-town corporation backed out 
of the project altogether. This decision indicated that the 
developers saw little likelihood of making a profit on eth-
anol production in the near future. 
This account is similar to others around the country. 
For example, on July 15, 2008 National Public Radio re-
ported:
A rush to cash in on ethanol has slowed as soaring corn 
prices squeeze profit margins for producers of the alterna-
tive fuel. At a recent high of $7 per bushel, the corn used 
to make ethanol has tripled in price since many plants 
were built two years ago, and some facilities have been 
shut down or put on hold. Corn is now more expensive 
than it was when many of the ethanol plants were built ... 
Two years ago, when many of the plants were being built, 
corn was $2 per bushel, making ethanol production so 
profitable, that in some cases a plant could be paid off in 
just 6 months (Siegel 2008). 
Economic factors alone, however, were not solely re-
sponsible for the failure of the proposed project. In fact, 
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no single factor is responsible for the failure of a proposed 
venture. Lack of trust in local officials, the structure of 
New York’s development process, and market forces all 
came together to undermine the viability of the intended 
ethanol project. Below, we will examine each individual 
factor in greater depth. A number of general observa-
tions about development in the state will follow. We end 
the report by discussing what training programs targeted 
at local leaders can do to make localities more effective in 
encouraging development.
(Dis)Trust in Local Development
A lack of trust in local officials delayed the siting process 
for the proposed ethanol plant in Upstate New York. Spe-
cifically, distrust of the Industrial Development Agency 
(IDA)1, was a critical factor in shaping resistance to the 
project. The IDA promoted the development project and 
coordinated the regulatory process. According to numer-
ous informants, residents distrusted the agency because 
of how it had handled development projects in the past. 
Specifically, respondents spoke poorly of the then director 
of the IDA who had been the target of public criticisms 
on numerous past occasions. Town supervisors accused 
him of being corrupt and of pushing through secret deals 
with local entrepreneurs. The head of the IDA was also 
the local head of economic development and of planning. 
Respondents claimed that they were concerned about his 
potential conflict of interest. 
The following post on a website devoted to challenging 
the proposed project perhaps best represents the grounds 
on which locals opposed the project:
Our leaders are not acting in the interests of the public at 
large, but rather on behalf of a few influential individu-
als to further their interests at the expense of the rest of 
us. They have been making decisions behind closed doors, 
and emerge only to spread disinformation about what 
they are doing and whose interests they are serving” (ac-
cessed August 30th 2007).
Locals also distrusted the IDA’s board of directors. 
Some claimed that the board members were involved in 
corrupt business deals as well as associated with a ques-
tionable group of politicians in the state capital. As one 
informant explained, “Some members of the IDA board 
represent a few big companies. They do not care about 
the quality of life of the local residents” (Interview, No-
vember 14th 2007). Approximately halfway through 
the development process, a number of board members 
were indicted for corruption. This, obviously, further 
entrenched the perception that the board was not to be 
trusted. Another interviewee elaborates:
 [The] County is small (32000-34000 residents). Every-
body knows everybody’s business and the mismanage-
ment of [the redevelopment site] has been an issue for 
some time. There has recently been an investigation into 
the misappropriation of funds and equipment from the 
old site. The DA from [another county] has been hired to 
do an investigation and he’s already released the first set 
of indictments. We expect another wave of indictments 
soon and we won’t be surprised it a couple of members of 
the IDA’s board are among those charged as well (Inter-
view November 22, 2007).
Locals perceived a close between the IDA officials and 
board members and the farmers collaborating with the 
out-of-state company. This did not help instill trust in the 
government agency. The local farmers had the reputation 
of cheating their neighbors. Interviewees referred to past 
events during which these entrepreneurs pushed through 
deals and misused their connections, in particular con-
nections with IDA and state officials, to get projects 
through. According to one respondent, during a meeting 
to discuss the proposed ethanol project, one of the lo-
cal partners told local activists that they were “little” and 
that he was going to “run right over” them (Interview, 
November 20, 2007). A local official we spoke to referred 
to the local entrepreneurs as “big time sleazebags” (Inter-
view, January 22, 2008). People we spoke to were already 
suspicious of the project merely because of who was in-
volved. A series of events amplified suspicion about the 
proposed ethanol plant. The IDA worked closely with the 
town planning board to obtain appropriate zoning for the 
development project. However, the speed at which zoning 
for the project was obtained raised suspicion, ultimately 
leading to a lawsuit. Further, the IDA also immediately 
began the environmental review process and requested 
lead agency status for the review. Typically, a large-scale 
development project is required by law to go though an 
environmental impact review process called the State En-
vironmental Quality Review (SEQR). The review of all 
large projects must be coordinated by a designated lead 
1IDAs are charged with the task of stimulating economic development in New York. Spe-
cifically, these agencies distribute  state and federal financial incentives to private actors 
as a means to attract development. They report to the New York Department of Economic 
Development and the Office of the State Controller. As of 2006 New York had 15 IDAs. For 
more information on these agencies see Hevsi, A.G “Industrial Development Agencies in 
New York State: Background, Issues and Recommendations”.  New York: Office of New York 
State Comptroller. May, 2006.
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agency. Any agency that issues a permit required for the 
development to proceed (an “involved” agency) may take 
on the role of lead agency. To take the lead, an agency 
must send a letter informing all involved agencies of its 
intention to take the lead. Involved agencies have a lim-
ited time to contest this decision, with authority to assign 
lead status ultimately assigned to the Commissioner of 
the Department of Environmental Conservation. 
In our case, the IDA requested lead agency status. A 
number of stakeholders commented on how uncommon 
it was to have the IDA act as lead agency for the SEQR 
process. This is because the IDA’s role is to promote de-
velopment. It is general practice to assign the role of 
lead agency to a more neutral regulatory body such as 
the town planning board. Having the IDA as lead agency 
raised suspicion in particular among local citizens who 
were concerned about the impact the project would have 
on the local environment. These individuals feared that 
environmental concerns would become secondary to 
economic development goals.
Once it became lead agency, the IDA took a number of 
actions that only furthered suspicious about the project 
and those promoting it. Within a few months of obtain-
ing lead agency status in January of 2007, the IDA issued 
a “negative declaration”. This meant that a complete envi-
ronmental impact assessment would not need to be com-
pleted. The declaration intensified suspicion. Local ac-
tors found it hard to believe that an ethanol plant would 
have no significant environmental impact, which is what 
a negative declaration implied. The decision to issue a 
negative declaration was particularly hard to understand 
since the plans for the development project also included 
the cultivation of biomass—specifically, willow seedlings 
that would be planted on several thousand acres. The rare 
species locals wanted to protect are known to enjoy eat-
ing these seedlings. Therefore, individuals were skeptical 
that planting acres of this crop would not affect the wild-
life in any way. In addition, the public expressed concern 
about the conditions under which the IDA was going 
to transfer the land to the developer. Numerous stake-
holders were under the impression that the out-of-state 
company was going to obtain a relatively large section of 
prime real estate for what was believed to be a very low 
cost and with what appeared to be no stipulations. 
It is important to recall that opposition to the proj-
ect was not strong when the proposed project was first 
unveiled. In fact, most individuals claimed that they ini-
tially welcomed the proposed ethanol plant. It was only 
when the zoning process appeared to be rushed, and 
when it appeared that the company would obtain 4,500 
acres of land for next to nothing and with no apparent 
restrictions that both citizens and individuals in decision 
making capacities openly expressed concern about how 
the permitting process was being handled. It was at this 
point that opponents to the project took actions to thwart 
development.
Four groups formally expressed concern about the 
project. The Town Board of the affected village wrote 
a letter to the IDA asking them to be more transparent 
about the terms and conditions under which it was hand-
ing over the land to the out-of-state corporation. In the 
letter the town board wrote:
We believe that there is potential for major environmen-
tal impact if the development occurs to the maximum 
extent described in the proposal on several items in Part 
2 of the Environmental Assessment Form. We encourage 
[the] IDA to check box 2 on these items and to provide a 
detailed response in Part 3. In doing so, please investigate 
carefully whether the impact can be mitigated, and de-
velop a plan that assure such mitigation. 
The neighboring town’s planning board also expressed 
concern about air quality, noise, the potential threat to 
the rare species population, the potential recreational op-
portunities, the increase in truck traffic, as well as a num-
ber of other environmental impacts (accessed November 
21 2007).
The New York Department of Environmental Conser-
vation (DEC) took issue with the negative declaration. In 
a letter dated March 13, 2007, the DEC’s regional permit 
administrator requested that the IDA overturn its negative 
declaration for the State Environmental Quality Review. 
In addition, a DEC official openly criticized the project 
at a public information meeting hosted by the IDA and 
the developer. The DEC maintained that the proposed 
project would have a significant environmental impact. 
Of particular concern was the plan to convert 3,400 acres 
of early successional shrubland to monoculture biomass 
production. As the DEC explained in a subsequent letter 
on June 28th 2007:
If nothing else, the species diversity of vegetation and 
wildlife present will be lower in the converted areas. The 
project site contains one of the largest blocks of shrubland 
in this area of New York State and the wildlife, particu-
larly species of birds, which depend upon this area habitat 
for food, nesting and shelter are species in greatest decline 
in the Northeast (DEC letter June 28th 2007). 
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alliance] filed an ‘Article 78’ petition on June 8, 2007, 
challenging the decision. We agree with the DEC that a 
proper assessment of the impacts of this project has not 
yet been made. The information submitted by [the out-
of-state company] in their initial application was full of 
errors, omissions, and misleading information. Instead of 
following the formal process required by the state’s SE-
QRA law, the applicants have sought to allay public con-
cern by running a series of news report ads and conduct-
ing a few slick public presentations, where they have used 
highly selective information to try to present their project 
in a favorable light. A sales pitch is not an environmental 
review. Many members of the public remain concerned 
that, in the absence of a proper EIS, as required by law, 
we simply don’t know what the real impacts of this project 
will be. There are good reasons why ethanol plants else-
where have been subjected to the EIS process. Perhaps a 
handful of individuals stand to profit from this project, 
but we need to consider the larger interests of the county 
and the region as a whole (Web blog accessed September 
2007, emphasis by authors).
It is important to note that both citizen groups did not 
object to the development project. During an interview, 
the leader of the wildlife conservation group stated that 
he had nothing against the out-of-state company. In fact, 
the conservation group eventually managed to forge a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the out-
of-state developers in April of 2007. Moreover, the hom-
eowner group’s eventual lawsuit was directed at the IDA, 
not the out-of-state company. The homeowner group 
argued that the IDA and the town failed to follow estab-
lished procedures during permitting and zoning. 
Citizens and even some officials we interviewed were 
troubled by the fact that the IDA was entrusted with 
managing the land. Furthermore, those against the proj-
ect were also concerned by how the agency was manag-
ing the property. As one respondent asserted,
From the beginning the IDA has not been forthright about 
its plans for the [redevelopment] site. For one, while they 
claimed that they cared about the rare species, they never 
really entertained the idea of conservation. The previous 
director of IDA said he didn’t give a hoot about the rare 
species in an interview with a reporter. Plus, they never 
took any alternative proposals seriously. They just did 
whatever they wanted. (Interview, November 2007). 
Two local citizens groups—namely, a community wild-
life organization as well as a group of homeowners—also 
publically articulated their reservations about the pro-
posed project throughout 2007. The community wildlife 
group was comprised of local environmentalists who had 
had an interest in the property since it had become avail-
able in the 1990s. This group’s objective was to protect the 
rare species population living within the redevelopment 
site. As the chairman of the organization explained dur-
ing an interview on November 20th, 2007:
Since its inception in 1999 our group’s objective has 
primarily been about educating the public about the his-
tory and wildlife and about getting information about 
properly developing the property out. The latter is im-
portant because the IDA has not been forthright from 
the get go. The group had submitted a number of propos-
als for how to develop the site. However, the IDA did not 
accept them.
The conservation group launched an extensive media 
campaign against the project when the plan was first an-
nounced. It put up posters, repeatedly wrote letters to the 
local newspapers and placed a number of large billboard 
adds in the vicinity of the town. The group also contacted 
the national media. The group was particularly worried 
that the rare species would not be able to survive once 
the proposed ethanol plant was built; according to the 
development plans the conservation area would be great-
ly diminished, leaving little room for the rare species to 
live. . The second local group was comprised of a group of 
citizens who owned property near the site. This alliance 
of approximately 100 individuals, which was primarily 
concerned about traffic, smells and noise, filed a lawsuit 
in which they petitioned the court to rescind the special-
use permit and the zoning change that the IDA made for 
the proposed project. In addition, the group asked that 
the developers be required to complete a full environ-
mental impact statement. The organization elaborated on 
its reasons for going to court on its homepage: 
Incredibly, on February 8th 2007, the IDA issued a find-
ing that stated: ‘The project does not include the poten-
tial for a significant adverse environmental impact.’ On 
that basis, the project was allowed to proceed without an 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), the only process 
which would have given the public a meaningful study 
of the impacts of a project of this scale. The Department 
of Environmental Conservation is on the record as not 
stating that the decision not to require an EIS is NOT 
SUPPORTED by the available documentation, AND 
SHOULD BE RESCINDED! It is for this reason that [our 
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 Local actors expressed their concerns on a web blog: 
“The concern that matters most, at the moment, is that 
not enough information is being provided [by the devel-
opers].” A second post claimed, “Apparently, for the sake 
of 35 jobs, we are being asked to rubber stamp a project 
which will clearly affect the surrounding area in profound 
and unknown ways, and we are expected to care so little 
about these environmental impacts that we should not 
inconvenience the promoters of this project.” 
Finally, the developers ultimate motivations was a ma-
jor issue as indicated by the following comment made by 
one of our informants,
Many of us felt that the company was only in the “game” 
to build plants for the federal and state subsidies. We were 
worried that as soon as the lucrative subsidies ended in 
five years, they would most likely either sell the facility or 
close it down (Written correspondence October 2008). 
Officials at the IDA were aware that some local resi-
dents did not trust the agency. However, when asked 
about this issue, they told quite a different story than 
their critics. First, officials at the IDA clarified that, like 
the local population, they had initially hoped that the 
redevelopment site would be used for recreation and 
conservation. When the site was abandoned in the mid 
1990s, a group of local officials formed a committee to 
develop a land use plan. Because the redevelopment site 
housed the only known population of a rare species in 
the country, maintenance of the fence surrounding the 
area was key to the survival of the rare species. In fact, 
this population had come about because they were cut off 
from other populations by the fence. Therefore, the first 
land use plan recommended transforming the site into 
a recreation and conservation area. However, the state 
government refused to assume the costs of preparing and 
maintaining the land for recreation and conservation—
which included upkeep of the fence. 
Disappointed by the state’s refusal, the IDA explains 
that the committee had no choice but to develop an al-
ternate plan. In the second land use plan, industrial de-
velopment and conservation would have to coexist so 
that the former could cover the cost of the latter. In other 
words, a developer who wanted to use part of the rede-
velopment site would have to pay to keep up the fence in 
order to protect the rare species. In fact, maintenance of 
the fence became a non-negotiable part of developing the 
land. However, maintenance of the fence was expensive. 
Many potential developers either could not afford this 
extra cost or were simply unwilling to pay. 
Prospective developers would also be obligated to 
maximize open areas when designing the layout of their 
site. Maximum open area would provide the rare species 
with a habitat large enough to ensure their survival. In 
other words, another stipulation was that seven thou-
sand five hundred acres, which made up the conserva-
tion area, could not be divided into small parcels. Finally, 
the property lacked appropriate infrastructure and con-
tained a number of polluted superfund sites. While the 
federal government would assume the costs associated 
with remediation, the cleanup process would inevitably 
complicate the development process. Further, the devel-
oper would have to assume a portion of the infrastruc-
tural costs. In brief, the physical characteristics of the 
proposed site made it difficult for the IDA to find suitable 
development projects. For ten years the IDA struggled to 
attract development on that site.
Whereas citizens thought that the IDA had obtained 
control of the property through dubious means, again of-
ficials at the IDA offered a different account. When the 
operation at the site closed during the 1990s, the county 
board of supervisors thought it would be best to hand 
over the management of the land over to the IDA rather 
than create a new organization, since the town had lim-
ited resources. This was because the IDA already existed 
and local authorities were convinced that it had the ca-
pacity to deal with the property. Far from being power 
hungry, the IDA was not eager to assume the responsi-
bility for the property. Dealing with the previous owners 
of the land, finding suitable developers, making sure the 
fence was maintained and the rare species were protected 
cost time and money. This task put a lot of strain on the 
IDA, which employs the equivalent of 3 full time staff 
members. 
Officials at the IDA were clear that having been en-
trusted with the task of managing the land was more of a 
burden than anything else. 
We already had a lot on our plate so we were not particu-
larly pleased when the county redevelopment planning 
committee—which formed from 1995 to 1997 to deter-
mine what would happen to the redevelopment site— de-
termined that we should take over the responsibility of 
managing the redevelopment site. Obviously, it did not 
make sense to create a whole new agency to manage the 
land since we had the know-how. However, we were re-
luctant to take on the project since it was going to cost a 
lot in terms of people hours and financial resources (In-
terview June 10th 2008).
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Not only was the redevelopment site difficult to de-
velop for the reasons outlined above, but officials at the 
IDA were also enthusiastic about the proposed ethanol 
plant given New York State’s depressed economy. The 
overall economic performance of this region has de-
clined steadily for the past few decades. When consid-
ering employment growth between 1995 and 2005, New 
York ranked 39th among U.S. states in private sector em-
ployment growth. If Upstate were considered a state in 
its own right, it would have ranked 47th. An important 
reason for this continued decline is the loss of manufac-
turing employment, and the failure to attract significant 
investment in different industries with a potential for 
growth. The loss of relatively well-paying manufacturing 
jobs merely adds to the economic distress faced in the 
region, since new jobs coming into the area often do not 
pay as well as the jobs lost (see Figure 1).
New York’s economic downturn was particularly pro-
nounced in our case study town. Since the mid 1990s, the 
town had experienced severe economic depression. The 
closure of operation at this site in 1995 led to 1,800 lost 
jobs. Shortly thereafter, a local psychiatric ward as well as 
a manufacturing firm closed down. These events led to 
additional job losses. As a result, this particular section of 
Upstate New York became economically depressed with 
few prospects for new development. New York’s econom-
ic condition, which was amplified in the small town we 
studied, meant that there were few prospects for develop-
ment and that there was a lot of pressure to attract devel-
opment projects, especially those that would be willing to 
accept the complications associated with developing on 
that particular piece of property.
In sum, the redevelopment site’s lack of appeal for de-
velopers, the cost of maintaining the property as well as 
the region’s economic depression, put pressure on those 
charged with local economic development in the area to 
find a suitable development project as soon as possible. 
According to local development officials, the project 
would provide much needed jobs and property tax rev-
enue for the town. Furthermore, the out-of-town etha-
nol developer agreed to take over the cost of maintaining 
the fence, indicated that it was willing to work with local 
conservationists to develop a site plan that maximized 
the roaming area for the rare species, and agreed to as-
sume the cost of cleaning the superfund sites as well as 
the cost of transportation and infrastructure develop-
ment. The IDA explained that it heavily supported the 
project for these reasons and not because the proposed 
ethanol plant would benefit any par-
ticular individual.
While it is not in our position to 
evaluate whether distrust in the IDA 
was well founded, or whether the IDA 
was entirely misunderstood, this case 
exemplifies that trust is an important 
factor in the development process. 
Lack of communication and distrust 
can lead to frustrations among citizens 
as well as among potential developers. 
Distrust and suspicion exacerbated 
negative attitudes toward the IDA as 
well as the out-of-town developer. In 
one interview, a frustrated executive at 
the out-of-state corporation asked: 
Why do these people think it’s all cor-
rupt? The IDA put us through the ringer. 
The IDA was demanding and rigorous, 
more so than we would have liked. Why 


































































































































































Figure 1: Change in Number of Jobs Statewide by Sector, 
1990-2005.
Note: “Sector” refers to BLS “super-sectors.” All super-sectors are included in the analysis above, collectively accounting for the entire New 
York State economy.
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for any development to occur. As noted above, a prospec-
tive developer also has to go through an environmental 
impact review process, the State Environmental Quality 
Review (SEQR). Typically, the issuing of permits as well 
as the SEQR process requires a series of public hearings 
and deliberations by elected officials. 
To understand the factors that influence the failure to 
attract investment to Upstate New York necessitates that 
we examine the local structure of government. Usually, 
the most common issue identified by analysts and busi-
nessmen alike is the high cost of doing business. Certain-
ly New York’s high taxes are a disincentive to invest in the 
state. Other costs like energy are also high. But there are 
sometimes various incentives offered by the state to com-
pensate for the high cost of doing business, and even then 
some efforts to attract new investments fail. Some have 
pointed to the balkanized economic development assis-
tance provided in New York. For example, it has been re-
ported that there are at least 28 New York state agencies 
that play some role in promoting economic growth. This 
lack of coordinated development support is merely exac-
erbated by the state’s large number of local government 
units that have some say in local business development. 
In fact, the New York Commission on Local Govern-
ment Efficiency and Competitiveness was established in 
2007 with a charge to identify possible changes in state 
policies that would, among other things, streamline local 
government, reduce costs and improve effectiveness. In 
speculating on likely results should its recommendations 
be adopted, the Commission wrote the following: “Lo-
cal governments will operate under more modern, con-
sistent, and understandable rules, and citizens will have 
a clearer understanding of where responsibility lies for 
services” (p. 1). This report is one of the few documents 
we have found that directly addresses the problems as-
sociated with a patchwork of 1,607 general purpose local 
governments with the authority to enact laws related to 
zoning, planning, and land development, all of which are 
of great significance for economic development. Given 
the fragmented structure of state economic development 
assistance and the complex patchwork of local rules and 
regulations impacting development, economic develop-
ment in New York is strongly influenced by factors at the 
local level, and the conditions encountered by economic 
developers anywhere in the state can vary substantially.
New York State’s constitution and subsequent legisla-
tion establish the principle of “home rule” which entitles 
local governments to self-govern in local affairs. The ori-
gins of the general principal have been traced back to the 
Magna Carta and even earlier, and it has been claimed 
that in New York home rule was asserted before the 
When asked what he would do differently, another ex-
ecutive responded,
I would take public opinion incredibly seriously. We took 
the time with the public but I underestimated the impor-
tance of public relations. If I had the chance to do ev-
erything over again, I would visit every person who had 
reservations about the project and address any concerns 
they might have (Interview, April 22, 2008).
Changes like the adoption of a new technology or the 
development of a new production facility may hold great 
promise but also present a certain degree of uncertainty 
or risk. When this uncertainty is considered, fears of un-
expected negative outcomes may be aroused. In addition 
to fears about negative outcomes, there may be a sense of 
uncertainty about who has the responsibility for and who 
bears the costs of possible damages. 
Typically public officials have the duty to see that de-
velopments are managed responsibly, and that any unin-
tended negative consequences are handled fairly and ef-
fectively. Lack of trust in the agencies or leaders overseeing 
a development project can be a significant impediment 
to its completion. For example, if community members 
mistrust those responsible for handling possible negative 
outcomes, they may oppose the development or propose 
alternatives to it. Such community opposition to a variety 
of developments is a common occurrence. This outcome 
would be expected given the results of research showing 
that in the absence of trust individuals tend to pursue 
their individual interests at the expense of the group. In 
contrast, when individuals trust other members of the 
group, they are more likely to cooperate in achieving an 
outcome that is in the best interests of the entire group. 
A lack of trust in local officials, whether it is founded on 
the truth or merely the result of poor communication, 
can be detrimental to an economic development project. 
As we will see below, the importance of trust in the de-
velopment process is particularly important in New York 
State, which emphasizes local control over development 
through Home Rule. 
Local Governance
The structure of New York State’s governance system 
also influenced the outcome of the proposed project. 
A prospective developer comes in contact with New 
York’s unique governance structure when s/he attempts 
to obtain permits and approval for a proposed project. 
Because economic development can affect the commu-
nity in a variety of positive and negative ways, permits of 
various types as well as appropriate zoning are required 
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Crown as a right by colonists to hold town meetings and 
deal with local concerns like the construction and main-
tenance of roads and care of the poor. 
As practiced in New York today, the principle of Home 
Rule resides with the primary authority –village, town, 
city, or county. In New York there are 1,607 of these 
so-called “general purpose governments.” They all have 
elected governing boards and under the home rule pro-
visions of the state constitution they have the authority 
to levy property taxes, issue debt and pass laws regulat-
ing land use and development within their jurisdictions. 
Home Rule gives local governments the broad authority 
to pass local laws relating to property and governance 
structures, provided such local laws are consistent with 
the New York State constitution and other legislation. 
Specifically, this authority allows local governments to 
enact laws related to zoning, planning, land development 
and natural resource conservation. 
Home Rule has several implications for understanding 
economic development in New York. Because author-
ity for land use decisions resides with the primary local 
authority, there is no uniform policy and local land use 
regulation, and planning practices vary widely. In this 
context local officials wield a great deal of influence and 
bear much responsibility in the development process. 
They enact and enforce the basic conditions of develop-
ment (e.g. land use zoning) and mediate the interests of 
developers and the community. Because local officials are 
central in the development process, they must command 
the trust of developers, community groups and individ-
ual community members for this process to move for-
ward smoothly. When trust in the ability of local officials 
to fairly and effectively handle a development project is 
lacking, opposition is likely to emerge. 
The political process associated with development, 
which occurs at the local or municipal level in New York, 
is somewhat unpredictable since a variety of public con-
cerns, some of which may be unanticipated, may be raised 
about a particular development. If the permitting process 
is considered legitimate, one can anticipate that delibera-
tions will proceed apace and the requisite permits will be 
issued subject to the investors agreeing to meet certain 
conditions. But another source of uncertainty comes into 
play if the legitimacy of the permitting process is called 
into question. A legitimate process is one that is widely 
viewed as resulting in decisions that are in the general 
public interest given the conditions under consideration. 
Lack of trust in the process can lead to appeals to outside 
authorities (e.g. the courts) for the adjudication of con-
flicting claims. 
We have argued that New York State’s de-centered and 
heterogeneous governance system is not inherently anti-
thetical to economic development. Contrary to the belief, 
which is widespread among developers in New York, that 
local governance has been the sole culprit in New York’s 
lagging economy, we contend that a host of contingen-
cies determine if the permitting process runs smoothly. 
Notably, New York State’s governance structure elevates 
trust in local officials to a critical factor in determining 
the success of a prospective development project. As our 
case study highlights, the (IDA), which took the lead in 
the development process for the ethanol plant, was un-
able to establish and maintain trust with local residents 
as well as other permit-issuing agencies. This had dire 
consequences for the outcome of the proposed ethanol 
project. However, had local residents trusted their offi-
cials, thereby rendering the political process associated 
with development less complicated, the proposed project 
still might have been unsuccessful. Beyond trust and the 
structure of New York’s governance system, market dy-
namics represent the third key ingredient in shaping the 
outcome of proposed economic development projects.
Market dynamics
Political factors at the local and state level influenced the 
development process. However, the success and failure 
of any development project is contingent upon the suc-
cessful articulation of political and market dynamics. To 
illustrate, in our case study the out-of-town company 
and its local counterpart first submitted their proposal 
to build an ethanol plant in Upstate New York in Janu-
ary 2007. The decision to invest in building an ethanol 
plant in New York came at a time when ethanol produc-
tion had become highly profitable. This increase in value 
was prompted by the federal government’s decision to no 
longer support the use of methyl tertiary-butyl (MTBE), 
a fuel additive. Until 2006 oil companies had used MTBE 
to comply with federal policies regarding the level of air 
pollution associated with burning gasoline. However, 
MTBE was associated with groundwater contamina-
tion. Ethanol performed the same function as MTBE, 
but it did not contaminate the groundwater. As a result, 
ethanol production became a lucrative endeavor almost 
overnight. The low price of corn—at the time corn cost 
$2 a bushel—, the 51-cent-per-gallon federal tax credit 
and the 25-cent New York State subsidy of which ethanol 
producers obtained a portion, further enhanced the high 
profit margin of ethanol production (Siegel 2008). 
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In order to reap the financial benefits of the ethanol bub-
ble, ethanol developers needed to act quickly. Construc-
tion was to begin as soon as possible. However, in our 
case study, resistance to the project peaked in early 2007, 
a critical moment in the race to corner the MTBE market. 
It was in February of 2007, that the chairman of the neigh-
boring town wrote a letter to the IDA requesting a full 
impact study. The local conservation group launched its 
resistance campaign in March. It was during this month 
that an article on the rare species controversy appeared 
in the New York Times. Finally, local residents filed their 
lawsuit against the IDA during this time as well. Public 
resistance hit at a critical moment. By the time we spoke 
to the out-of-town developers in September of 2007, the 
executives stated that the MTBE replacement market had 
been flooded. According to these developers, the window 
of opportunity had passed due to public resistance. Chris 
Hurt, professor of agricultural economics at Purdue Uni-
versity explains, “The ethanol industry is going through 
some ... adjustments or, we might say, growing pains. 
We’ve seen some very rapid changes in prices” (NPR July 
15, 2008). Hurt clarifies that two factors explain the drop 
in profitability during 2007-2008. First, the need for a 
MTBE replacement was quickly met. And second, corn 
prices had risen due to increased demand. 
By early 2008, the margin of profitability for ethanol pro-
duction—which was narrower in New York State due to 
the high utility costs —had decreased dramatically. We 
interviewed executives at the out-of-town corporation 
as well as officials at the IDA during this period. When 
asked about the status of the project, the investors re-
ported that they were waiting for the IDA to secure gov-
ernment grants for the construction of transportation 
and utilities infrastructure. Officials at the IDA, in turn, 
explained that they were waiting for further instructions 
from the developers. The attitude towards the project had 
shifted substantially. Whereas in the past the IDA and the 
out-of-state corporation had spoken with urgency about 
dealing with local resistance to the project, obtaining all 
the necessary permits and moving through the SEQR 
process, now both parties seemed willing to wait. Finally, 
in the late spring of 2008, at a time when the net return 
on ethanol production had hovered around 16-25 cents/
gallon for months (August 23, 2008), the out-of-state 
corporation declared that it was backing out of the proj-
ect altogether. 
Figure 2: Net Returns of Ethanol Production (profits) per Bushel 
and per Gallon



























































































































Markets by their very nature fluctuate and the returns 
to investment needed to justify capital outlays depend 
on prevailing prices within a specified planning period. 
Because investors typically cannot control markets, tim-
ing is a central aspect of economic development. When 
viable investment conditions are in place, investors must 
seize those opportunities or risk losing them, at least for 
some period of time. The representatives of the out-of-
state company were explicit that timing was the key to 
the success of their development process. As indicated 
above, they estimated that if the ethanol plant could be 
built in a particular timeframe, they would be able to 
make a return of their investment within one or two 
years. However, should the timing of the project be off, 
then it would not be worth building the plant. In our case 
study, the permitting process was delayed due to distrust 
in local officials, the effects of which we amplified by New 
York’s structure of governance. This delayed construction 
of the plant, leading the developers to miss the critical 
window of opportunity. 
The temptation to hold the political process constant, 
in other words, to create a situation in which developers 
can immediately capitalize upon possibly fleeting market 
opportunities is understandably great. In fact, a number 
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of counties in New York State have attempted to bypass 
or hold constant the political process associated with 
development, through a new initiative called the shovel 
ready program . Shovel ready refers to a pre-permitting 
program, where a community or a local developer inden-
tifies a site for a specific form of economic development 
and obtains all necessary permits, including the SEQR, 
for a particular form of development. Typically, on a 
shovel ready site all major preliminary work such as in-
frastructure construction, soil and geotechnical tests has 
been done. Often, the developer only has to decide on 
landscaping and go through the site plan review. 
The shovel ready program is an attempt to attract new 
development to the state. Since all necessary permits 
have been obtained in advance a developer can begin 
building immediately. The New York State Governor’s 
office writes, “By reducing the time it takes a company 
to begin construction of a new facility, New York State 
and its local partners are able to provide valuable savings 
to the business and job opportunities for local residents” 
(http://www.gorr.state.ny.us/SR_welcome.html, accessed 
24.4.2008). In brief, the shovel ready process is intend-
ed to bypass all major potential sources of delay in the 
development process so that investors can immediately 
capitalize on market dynamics.
However, the shovel ready program has been subject to 
numerous criticisms. Local agencies complain that they 
do not have enough money in their budget to cover the 
costs of rendering a site shovel ready. Legislators are re-
luctant to raise taxes and, economically depressed Upstate 
communities do not have the necessary capital. More-
over, local officials argue that it is not the town’s duty to 
assume all the costs associated with development. These 
officials resent the fact that the responsibility, risks and 
costs of development have devolved to the local commu-
nity. Finally, shovel ready is rarely feasible in New York 
State because of the high cost of land. A county or town 
must own the land it will make shovel ready. However, 
few localities can afford to purchase prime real estate. 
Theoretically, had the redevelopment site been shovel 
ready, the project might not have been delayed to the 
point where market conditions no longer favored an 
ethanol plant. When faced with the question of why they 
did not render the site shovel ready, both developer as 
well as the IDA, however, clarified that shovel ready was 
not an option for this project. The IDA explained that the 
economically depressed region could not afford the cost 
of rending the site shovel ready. The ethanol producer 
pointed out that ethanol production technology is con-
tinually changing. Theoretically, by the time all necessary 
permits had been obtained for a shovel ready ethanol 
site, new permits would be needed for the new technol-
ogy. Thus, in instances where the shovel ready program 
cannot be used such as our case study, economic devel-
opment remains contingent upon successful articulation 
of political processes and market dynamics.
Conclusion: Lessons Learned
Throughout this report, we have offered a series of gen-
eral observations about the development process in New 
York State. A particular focus has been on understanding 
the role of New York State’s unique development process 
plays in its lagging economic development. In brief, we 
have argued that successful economic development ne-
cessitates the synchronization of political processes and 
economic dynamics. In other words, rather than assume 
that market forces alone determine economic devel-
opment, we must also acknowledge the role the politi-
cal process plays. By the same token, it is inaccurate to 
singularly blame New York State’s development process 
when economic development projects fail.
Our case study highlights the importance of transpar-
ency, trust and good communication among local offi-
cials as well as between officials and the general public 
throughout the development process. New York State’s 
emphasis on Home Rule in governance makes local of-
ficials central players in economic development. Because 
local officials carry out the development process in New 
York State their trustworthiness is of central importance. 
If the public believes that these officials are untrust-
worthy, then there is a chance that the local population 
will perceive any development project local officials pro-
mote as inherently dubious. 
Since New York State’s governance structure can, in 
certain instances, negatively influence economic devel-
opment, one could make a case for the abandonment of 
Home Rule and the establishment of a more centralized 
and standardized governance structure. Indeed, many 
developers and investors largely blame the confusing and 
cumbersome political process associated with develop-
ment in New York for the state’s lagging economy. In 
response, these developers propose standardizing New 
York’s decentralized and heterogeneous political land-
scape, thereby creating a smooth and frictionless surface 
where capital can easily come and go as the market dic-
tates. 
However, not all development projects are created 
alike. Certain forms of economic development, such as 
ethanol, are particularly sensitive to market forces and 
thus less compatible with New York’s political process. 
Doug Hofstrand at the Agriculture Marketing Resource 
Center at Iowa State University explains, “The profitabil-
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ity of ethanol production is extremely variable. Due to 
the volatile price nature of ethanol and corn, its major 
feedstock, ethanol profitability can change rapidly from 
month to month. In addition, price variations of its co-
product (distillers grains with soluble, DGS) and its en-
ergy source (natural gas) add to the variability of ethanol 
profits” (Hofstrand website, accessed August 23, 2008). 
These types of developments necessitate a speedy politi-
cal process. In other words, permitting must be obtained 
quickly so that investor can obtain sufficient returns on 
their investment. This form of economic development is 
less compatible with New York State’s locally based sys-
tem of governance, which involves a lengthy political 
process. 
The system of Home Rule has a number of positive at-
tributes. Rather than abandon this form of governance 
altogether, we would be better served to recognize that 
not all development projects are alike. Certainly, devel-
opment projects that are heavily influenced by volatile 
market forces do not articulate well with New York’s gov-
ernance structure. However, other types of economic de-
velopment projects can work with New York State’s devel-
opment process. A comprehensive development plan that 
takes New York State’s distinctive development process 
into consideration could help preserve the state’s unique 
system of democratic governance while also stimulating 
economic development.
More emphasis is needed on developing the capacity of 
local officials to facilitate local development. Local lead-
ers and officials must have the capacity to elaborate and 
implement development strategies and to fully take ad-
vantage of state and federal resources and opportunities. 
Maintenance of such a leadership base is an ongoing chal-
lenge. Leaders and public officials come from a variety of 
backgrounds and may not have had sufficient training to 
deal with complex and changing circumstances. Another 
factor is the turnover in elected officials. New York faces 
a major challenge is helping communities develop and 
maintain the leadership needed to move forward. As in-
dicated in this case study, leaders must have the capacity 
to competently manage the development process and in-
still the trust of their constituents. Only then can they ef-
fectively respond to emerging domestic and global mar-
ket opportunities for community development. u
CARDI REPORTS/ISSUE NUMBER 8/MARCH 2009             15 
References
A.T. Kearny (Report prepared for Empire State Development). 
2007. Delivering on the Promise of New York State: A 
Strategy for Economic Growth and Revitalization. http://
www.atkearney.com/main.taf?p=5,3,1,183 (accessed June 
20, 2008). 
Baland, Jean-Marie and Jean-Philippe Platteau. 1996. Halting 
Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a Role for Ru-
ral Communities? Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Brown, David L. and Stefan Reyer. 1999. “The Volume and 
Composition of Internal Migration to and from New York.” 
Pp. 228-240 in Tom A. Hirschl and Tim B. Heaton (eds.), 
New York State in the 21st Century. New York: Praeger. 
Freudenburg, William R. 1993. “Risk and Recreancy: Weber, 
the Division of Labor, and the Rationality of Risk Percep-
tions.” Social Forces 71(4):909-932. 
Hofstrand, Doug. Tracking Ethanol Profitability. 23. August. 
2008. Ag Decision Maker. Iowa State University. http://
www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm/energy/html/d1-10.html 
Murdock, Steven H., Richard S. Krannich and F. Larry Leis-
tritz. 1999. Hazardous Wastes in Rural America. Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
New York State Association of Counties. 2007. The Popula-
tion Shuffle: The Latest Census Population Estimates and 
How They Impact Our Counties. June. http://www.nysac.
org/Policy_and_Research/Reports.php (accessed June 20, 
2008).
New York State Commission on Local Government Efficiency 
and Competitiveness. 2008. 21st Century Local Govern-
ment: Report of the New York State Commission on Local 
Government Efficiency and Competitiveness. Nyslocalgov.
org. (April). 
Nisbet, Erik. 2007. Empire State Poll 2007 Report 2: Empire 
Poll Results. Survey Research Institute, Cornell University.
Nisbet, Erik. 2005. Empire State Poll 2006 Report 3: Social and 
Political Evaluations. Survey Research Institute, Cornell 
University.
Nisbet, Erik. 2005. Empire State Poll 2005 Report 2: Political, 
Economic, Social. Survey Research Institute, Cornell Uni-
versity.
Nisbet, Erik. 2004. Empire State Poll 2004 Report 2: Political, 
Economic, Social. Survey Research Institute, Cornell Uni-
versity.
Nolon, J.R., 1993. The Erosion of Home Rule Through the 
Emergence of State Interests in Land Use Control. Pace En-
vironmental Law Review 10(2):497-562. 
Pendall, Rolf, Matthew P. Drennan and Susan Christopherson. 
2004. Transition and Renewal: Emergence of a Diverse Up-
state Economy. Brookings Institution Survey Series (Janu-
ary). 
Pendall, Rolf. 2003. Upstate New York’s Population Plateau: 
The Third-Slowest Growing ‘State’. Brooking Institution 
Survey Series (August). 
Siegel, Robert. High Corn Prices Cast Shadow Over Ethanol 
Plants. NPR. 15. July.2008. http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyId=92559699.
Weiner, Joseph L. 1937. “Municipal Home Rule in New York.” 
Columbia Law Review 37(4):557-581. 
16             CARDI REPORTS/ISSUE NUMBER 8/MARCH 2009
